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To properly appreciate the legal significance of the Ohio
Guest Act, it is desirable to look at the law as it previously
stood, the difficulty which this act attempted to remedy, and the
judicial interpretation of the several acts in other states.
COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF THE OWNER OR OPERATOR
OF A MOTOR VEHICLE TO His GUEST
The case of Sparrow, Ex'r., et al. v. Levine, Adm'r.1 ex-
presses the Ohio common law rule and is the weight of authority
in this country. The rule is accurately stated in the syllabus
which reads, "The owner or operator of an automobile owes to
an invited guest the duty to exercise reasonable care in the
operation of an automobile and not to unreasonably expose him
to danger and injury."2 The Arkansas courts have held this
rule to apply whether the occupant is invited or self invited, or
whether he be a guest or passenger or guest by sufferance.' Some
courts have made the distinction between one who pays for his
transportation, calling him a passenger, and one who rides gra-
tuitously calling him a guest; and these courts impose a duty of
greater degree of care to the former than to the latter.! Ohio
I19 Ohio App. 94 (1923).
2 See Lindeman v. Rosahe, 2 Ohio Abs. 235 (1924). A minority view
adheres to the degree of negligence theory. See the following authorities:
Pepper v. Morrill, 24 Fed. 2d 320 (1928); Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App.
202, 136 S.E. 96 (1926); Dailey v. Phoenix Inv. Co., 155 Wash. 597, 285
Pac. 657 (1930). This theory has been greatly disapproved in a number of
cases. See Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 Fed. 2d 502 (1934).
3 Bennett v. Bell, 176 Ark. 690 3 S.W. (2d) 996 (1928) ; GuerdiA v.
Fisher, 179 Ark. 742, 18 S.W. (2d) 345 (1929). But in any case, the host
is not an insurer. Flier v. Flier, 461 Pa. 519, 152 Ad. 567 (1930).
4 Garrett v. Hammock, 162 Va. 42, 173 S.E. 535 (1934).
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apparently does not make this distinction, for the court in Spar-
row v. Levine' said at page IOI, "The courts of Ohio have not
differentiated as to the degree of care in an action for damages
for a tort, except in cases of carriers for hire, when the highest
degree of care is required." The gratuitous nature of the trans-
action, or the nature of the consideration given by the occupant
for his ride is, however, an important factor to be considered by
the jury in determining what is reasonable care within the Ohio
rule.
While in most states, including Ohio, the driver's negligence
will not be imputed to the guest,' the latter is under a duty to
use reasonable care for his own safety.' If the guest can be
said to be contributorily negligent or acquiescent in the driver's
negligence of which he is conscious and does not protest, he may
not recover.8 A guest may not completely give himself up to
the care of the driver, and then claim that he was in the exercise
of proper care.' This duty of the passenger to learn of the
danger and warn the driver thereof is only to the extent of
using ordinary care, however."0 The intoxication of the guest
may constitute contributory negligence, although it is not so of
itself."
19 Ohio App. 94 (19z3).
See note on imputed negligence, 32 MICH. L.REv., 274 (1934).
7 The guest must exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Hughes v.
Hazslemen, 44 Ohio App. 516 (1933); Rohr, Admr. v. The Scioto Valley
Traction Co., i Ohio App. 275 (19z7). In B. & 0. R. R. v. Brown,
Admr., 36 Ohio App. 404, 173 N.E. 298 (930) where the host's car stalled
on the railroad track, the court held that the guest was bound to exercise ordi-
nary care for her own safety and that the fact of whether or not she exercised
the proper care was a question for the jury.
8 Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241, 291 S.W. 449 (1927).
0 Smith v. Rinderknect Lumber Co. Io Ohio App. 37 (I93 1); Hocking
Valley Ry. Co. v. Wyke (I2z O.S. 391, 17 N.E. 86o (1930). But the negli-
gence of the host may not be imputed to the guest in Ohio unless they are
in the execution of a joint enterprise. Toledo Ry. Co. v. Mayers, 93 Ohio
St. 304, IIz N.E. 1014 (1916); Ruskamp v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 23
N.P. (N.S.) 553 (919).
'oSimensky v. Zwyer, 40 Ohio App. 275, 178 N.E. 422 (193 I).
"Simensky v. Zwyer, supra. Whether the guest was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in going to sleep has been uniformly held to be a question
of fact for the jury. See interesting notes in 12 BOSTON U.L. REv., 314
(1932); 17 MINN. L.R~v., 22z (933); 31 MIcH. L.REv. 717 (I935).
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The protection which the common law affords the guest has
led to a tremendous amount of litigation. The increasing num-
ber of cases has caused insurance companies to bring pressure
upon the several legislatures in an attempt to induce them to
pass these Guest Acts, relieving hosts of liability to their
guests.12 The plight of the insurance company is well expressed
in Best's Insurance News, issue for Dec. io, 1932, at page 425,
"Automobile liability insurance has given birth to an entirely
new but very rapidly growing class of litigation, popularly
termed "guest cases" in which the plaintiff, while purportly
seeking compensation from the driver of the car in which he
was injured, is generally using his host as a mere conduit for
recovery from his assurer. Such cases are difficult if not im-
possible of defense on the merits, by reason of the defendant's
desire to see his friend or relative collect for his injuries in-
asmuch as it is the insurance company that pays."
The Ohio Guest Act 3 reads as follows: "The owner,
operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle 4 shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from
injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without
payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from
the operation thereof unless such injuries or death are caused
by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner, or
person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle."
Connecticut was the first state to enact this type of legisla-
tion in 1927. The amended statute in 1930 was the model for
subsequent legislation in other states. The Connecticut Statute
precludes recovery by the guest unless the accident "shall have
12 For a list of states legislating on this subject, see i8 IOWA L.REv., 78,
79, Note 7 (1932).
" Ohio G.C. Sec. 63o8-6, I15 Ohio Laws 57 (933) effective June
14, 1933.
14 Par. 2 of the G.C. Sec. 6zo now defines "motor vehide" as follows:
C 'Motor vehicle' means any vehicle propelled or drawn by power other than
muscular power, except road rollers, traction engines, steam shovels, gasoline
shovels, electric shovels, well-drilling machinery, ditch-digging machinery and
farm machinery."
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been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused
by his heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others."
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF GUEST ACTS
Constitutionality
The constitutionality of the Connecticut Act was upheld in
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Silver v. Silver," io8
Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 24o (192.8), affirmed in the United States
Supreme Court, 280 U.S. 117, 74 L.Ed. 67 (I929). The court
held that a state statute providing that no person carried gra-
tuitously as a guest in an automobile may recover from the
owner or operator for injuries caused by its negligent operation,
is not in conflict with the equal protection of the laws clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because of the distinction it makes
between passengers so carried in automobiles and those in other
classes of vehicles. In pointing out that the regulation need not
apply to all vehicles, Mr. Justice Stone said in 280 U.S. 117,
124, "It is enough that the present statute strikes at an evil
where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most fre-
quently occurs."'"
The Michigan Guest Act was likewise assailed as contra-
vening the Equal Protection of Laws clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment but was upheld in Naudzius v. Lahr." The court
said, "It would be threshing old straw to discuss the accepted
fact that the motor car has presented social, financial, and gov-
ernmental problems which justify the legislature in reasonably
classifying it apart from other vehicles in the enactment of
laws."
An Oregon statute,"8 reading that acceptance of a free ride
in a motor vehicle will be presumed to be a waiver by said guest
of liability for accidental injury caused him by the owner or
'" Gen. Stat. Rev. of 1930, Sec. I6z8.
26See Romansky v. Cestaro, jo9 Conn. 654, 145 Ad. 156 (I929).
17 253 Mich. z16, 234 N.W. 581 (93I).
1" Chap. 342, 1927 Session Laws.
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driver, was held unconstitutional in Stewart v. Hauk. " The
court said that while the legislature may change the remedy or
the form of procedure, attach conditions precedent to its exer-
cise, and perhaps abolish old and substitute new remedies, it
cannot deny a remedy entirely. In Oregon the statute sought
to wipe out entirely the jural significance of a breach of duty
which previously was regarded as a cause of action. In 1929,
however, Oregon changed its statute" to read like that of Con-
necticut. The amended statute was upheld in Perozzi v. Ga-
niere,2 the court holding that the enactment was within the
police power of the legislature and not invalid as contrary to
the state constitution which gives every man a remedy by due
course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or
reputation. Article I, Sec. io of the Oregon Const.22
The Delaware statute relieving the operator or owner of a
motor vehicle from any liability whatsoever to his guest was
held unconstitutional in Coleman v. Rhodes."s The court said
that the legislature could not relieve the operator or owner of
an automobile from the consequences of an act that was inten-
tional or wilful. Delaware, too, later enacted a new Guest Act
modeled after the Connecticut statute.2" Intentional, wilful and
wanton disregard of the rights of others were made exceptions
to relief of host's liability. Its constitutionality was upheld in
Hazzard v. Alexander.25
The Ohio Guest Act which includes "vehicles" solely within
its scope will (on the authority of Silver v. Silver, sapra) in all
probability not be held unconstitutional on the ground of re-
19 27 Or. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (I928).
20 55__12o Oregon Code 1930.
21 40 Pac. (2d) ioo9 (Or., 1935).
22 This section of the Oregon Constitution is very similar to Article i,
Sec. 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
23 159 Ad. 649 (Dela., 1932). An amendment to the Guest Act of
California eliminating gross negligence as a ground for recovery was held not
unconstitutional as destroying the right of recovery for negligence. Forsman
v. Colton, 136 Calif. App. 97, z8 Pac. (zd) 429 (1933).
24 1933 Laws Del. Vol. 38, C. z6.
25 173 Ad. 517 (Dela., 1934).
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pugnancy to the Equal Protection of Laws clause. And the fact
that the remedy of the guest in Ohio is not wholly taken away
but merely limited, will probably influence the Ohio courts not
to hold the Ohio Guest Act unconstitutional as depriving one
of his constitutional remedy under Article I, Sec. 16 of the
Ohio Constitution on authority of Perozzi v. Ganiere, supra.26
Is the Act Retroactive?
The first problem relative to Guest Acts that arose in the
several states was the question of whether or not the Act was
retroactive. The answer has usually been held to depend upon
whether or not the subject matter of the act defines substantive
or remedial rights. If the statute relates to substantive rights
it cannot be retroactive since it would contravene Sec. 28, Art.
II of the Ohio Constitution which denies the legislature the
right to pass retroactive laws. This was expressly held in Rita
L'Archer v. Rosenberger." It has been held in Ohio in the case
of Smith v. N. Y. C. R. R., et all23 that "a statute which relates
exclusively to remedial rights is not within the purview of the
constitutional inhibition against the legislative enactment of
retroactive laws." In a case decided one month earlier the Ohio
Guest Act was held not to be retroactive on the ground that the
act contained no provision making it applicable to pending sec-
tions. "' In Castro v. Sin gh,3° the court said, "The guest's right
to sue his host for gross negligence or any type of negligence
existed at common law; and any statute impairing that common
law right is not retroactive in operation unless made so by its
terms."" 1
"I Art. I, Sec. 16 guarantees to every person for injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation a remedy by due course of law.
2 Px N.P. (N.S.) 137 (1933). See also Smith v. Laffar, 137 Ore. 230,
z Pac. (2d) 18 (1931) where the act was held to define substantive law.
is xzz Ohio St. 45, 17o N.E. 637 (1930).
2J TVm. Schultz v. City of Cincinnati, et al., 31 N.P. (N.S.) 284 (1933).
See also Weller, Ext's. v. TV. Orstall, 129 Ohio St. 603, i8 Ohio Abs. (1935).
0 131 Calif. App. io6, 21 Pac. (2d) 169, 170 (1933).
31 See also Godfrey v. Brown, 12o Calif. 57, 29 Pac. (2d) 165 (I934);
Callet v. Alito, 2io Calif. 65, 29 o Pac. 438 (1930). Cf. Willi v. Schaefer
Hitchcock Co., z17 Iowa 183, 251 N.W. I8 (I933); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 213
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Wilful Misconduct, Wanton and Reckless
Disregard, and Gross Negligence32
In DeShelter v. Kordt (note 3 1) interpreting the Michigan
Guest Act, the accident having happened in Michigan, the court
held that the host was not wilfully negligent in running over a
concrete abutment because of a glare of lights. The court de-
fined "wilful" under the Michigan Act as "including design and
purpose and implying that the act was done with a set purpose
to accomplish the results which followed it. It involves more
than negligence; it implies malice."" The court in Reser^ve
Trucking Co. v. Fairchild,"4 defines "wilfulness" (quoting Mar-
shall, C. J. in Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59) as implying
"design, set purpose, intention, deliberation." The court then
concluded that strictly speaking, "wilful negligence" was not
negligence at all; for whenever an exercise of the will is exerted
there must be an end to inadvertence. 5 Thus several courts
have refused to consider going to sleep while driving as wilful
misconduct within the meaning of the Guest Act. 8 Massachu-
setts contra." This rule of holding going to sleep not wilful
Iowa 646, 238 N.W. 682 (1931). Whether or not the Act defines substantive
rights may become a question of some importance where an accident occurs
in a foreign state: if the act is remedial or procedural the law of the forum
must control; but if substantive, the law of the place where the accident
occurs, governs. Rita L'Archer v. Rosenberger, 31 N.P. (N.S.) 137 (1933)-
DeShelter v. Kordt, 43 Ohio App. 237, 183 N.E. 85 (I931). See also Her-
rell v. Hickok, 49 Ohio App. 347 (i934).
32 See the very enlightening article of Mr. J. R. Corish, The Automobile
Guest, 14 BosToN L.R. REv., 728 (1934).
'3 Montgomery v. Muskingum Booming Co., 88 Mich. 633, 5o N.W.
729 (189I).
34 128 Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (i934).
11 See Peterson. v. Detwiler, 255 N.W. 529 (Iowa, 1934); and see Fly
v. Swink, 17 Tenn. App. 627, 69 S.W. (2d) 902 (934), holding inadvert-
ence not equivalent to "heedlessness" under the Texas Act.
8 Boos v. Sauer, 266 Mich. 230, 253 N.W. 278 (i934.); Bailin v.
Phoenix, 1O2 Calif. App. 117, 282 Pac. 41 (i929); See note in 18 MAR-
QUETTE L.REv., 193 0934).
17 Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 48o, 169 N.E. 412 (1929). See Har-
rington v. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 Pac. (2d) 553 (1934),
where the driver lost consciousness at the wheel and was held not liable for
resulting accident. The Court in Cleveland Ry. v. Owens, 3 Ohio Op. 516,
(decided April 22, 1935) held that intoxication itself, alone does not consti-
tute negligence.
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misconduct does not obtain where a sleepy auto driver refuses
to allow his guest to leave the car after which the driver falls
asleep causing the car to crash.
Where the charge is wilful negligence, contributory negli-
gence is no defense any more than it would be in an assault and
battery case.38 The court in Higbee v. Jackson20 has defined
wanton negligence in the third paragraph of the syllabus: "To
constitute wanton negligence it is not necessary that there should
be ill will toward the person injured, but an entire absence of
care for the safety of others which exhibits indifference to conse-
quences." Exceeding the speed limit has been held not to con-
stitute "wanton and wilful misconduct" requisite to maintain
statutory action by an auto guest."'
The term "recklessness" is similar to "wantoness" and is
defined under the Connecticut Guest Act cases as "an indiffer-
ence to the consequences of the driver's conduct."'" In these
cases the evidence must show more than negligence. 2 Mere
error of judgment or mere inadvertence is not sufficient to give
the guest a recovery under the statute.'
Elements of wanton and wilful misconduct are well stated
by the court in McLove v. Bean." They are: i. Knowledge of
the situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care; 2. Ability
to avoid injury by ordinary care; 3. Omission to use care to
38 DeShelter v. Kordt, supra, citing Gibbard v. Cursam, zzS Mich. 311,
z96 N.W. 398 (I933).
31o101 Ohio St. 75, iz8 N.E. 6I (i92o). This definition was approved
in Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, i8 Ohio St. 519 0934)
, 
which in
turn is quoted by the Court in Bennie Booksbaum v. J. M. Cousins, 4 Ohio
OP. 8z (decided September i9, 1935).
40 Finkler v. Zimmer, z58 Mich. 336, 241 N.W. 85i (1932). Failure
to perform a statutory duty is not wilful misconduct within the Act. There
must be actual or constructive knowledge of peril. Brown v. Fernandez, 140
Calif. App. 689, 36 Pac. (ad) 12 (1934).
41 Vanderkruik v. Mitchell, 118 Conn. 6z5, 173 At. goo (1934).
42Berman v. Berman, i i oConn. 169, I 4 7 At. 568 (19z9).
' Vanderkruik v. Mitchell, supra.
44 263 Mich. 113, 248 N.W. 566 (1933).
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avert the threatened danger.45 Wilful or wanton misconduct
need not be the sole cause of the accident in order to render the
host liable under the act. If wilful misconduct contributed in
the least respect, this is sufficient. Luke v. Marion, 271 11.
App. 48 (1933).
Gross negligence interpreted under the Nebraska Guest Act
is defined as being greater than want of ordinary care or slight
negligence and is equal to negligence of a very high degree but
does not necessarily extend to wanton or wilful disregard." The
examination of the cases defining gross negligence reveals a
hopeless turmoil of definitions, some courts including wanton-
ness as an element, others not. The Vermont test of gross
negligence is "indifference to legal duty or other forgetfulness
of the plaintiff's safety." The Ohio rule on the subject seems
the most reasonable. The court in Sparrow v. Levine7 says:
"An examination of the authorities in Ohio leads to grave
doubts as to whether there is an intelligible distinction existing
between gross negligence and mere negligence. Gross negli-
gence is negligence "with a vituperative epithet."4
Who Is a Guest Within the Act
Whether one is a guest within the meaning of the Guest
Act becomes very important where the Act is pleaded as a de-
45 See to the same effect, Elowitz v. Miller, 265 Mich. 551, 251 N.W.
548 (1934). See also Forsman v. Colton, 136 Calif. App. 97, 28 Pac. (2d)
429 (932) distinguishing wilful misconduct from negligence. Cf. Monica
v. Smith, 138 Calif. App. 695, 33 Pac. (2d) 418 (1934) defining these
terms.
4, Cf. Meck v. Fowler, 35 Pac. (2d) 410, 412 (1934). Reversed in 45
Pac. (2d.) 194. This court said, "In this state the degrees of negligence are
recognized. . . . In my opinion wilful misconduct is merely a degree of
negligence, but of the highest or greatest degree."
Where a host is grossly negligent it is no defense that he did everything
possible to extricate his guest from the peril which he made for him. Meath
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 179 Wash. 177, 36 Pac. (2d.) 533 (I934).47 i9 Ohio App. 94, 105 (1923).
48 See Telegraph. Company v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301 at page 312, 41
Amer. Rep. 500 (i88i). In Simon v. Detroit Ry., 196 Mich. 586, 589, 16z
N.W. 1012, 1013, gross negligence is defined as "The Intentional failure to
perform a manifest duty, in wanton, wilful or reckless disregard of the conse-
quences as affecting the life or property of another."
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fense. Section 3 of the California Guest Act specifically defines
a guest as being a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle with-
out giving compensation therefor." In Crawford v. Foster"°
the court said, "We think the meaning of the language used is
that a guest is one who is invited, either directly or by implica-
tion to enjoy the hospitality of a driver of a car; who accepts
such hospitality;5" and who takes a ride either for his own pleas-
ure or on his own business without making any return to or
conferring any benefit upon the driver of the car other than the
mere pleasure of his company.""
It is generally held that one giving some consideration for
carriage is a passenger and not a "guest" within the Guest
Acts.' The Ohio Guest Act specifically relieves a host of lia-
bility to a "guest while being transported without payment
therefor." What then constitutes payment to take the case out
of the Act? The consideration given for the ride need not neces-
sarily be monetary. Thus in Haney v. Takakura,"4 where the
plaintiff rode with his host, assisting in marketing oranges at
the host's request, the plaintiff was held not a guest but a pas-
senger rendering compensation. The court in Smith v. Leflar,"
in explaining the Oregon statute defined payment as "the trans-
fer of money or property or some other thing of value in the
discharge of an existing obligation. Ordinarily it means the
discharge in money of a sum due. And the test of whether there
was a sum due for transportation . . . is whether the defen-
dant could have recovered in an action at law for the reasonable
or agreed value of the transportation furnished." It has been
4
' Stat. 1929 page i58O.
5' 11o Cal. App. 8I, 293 page 841 (1930).
"The host-guest relationship is not affected by the fact that the host and
guest are blood relatives. Najiar v. Horwitz, 17z Ad. 255 (Rhode Island,
1934). See also Kaplan v. Kaplan, 213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682 (1931).
5- See the Restatement of Torts, sec. 490, for the A.L.I. definition of
"guc;t." See Nemoitin v. Berger, iXi Conn. 18, 149 Ad. 233 (1930); Ro-
mansky v. Cestaro, 1o9 Conn. 654, 145 AtI. 156 (1929).
a Garrett v. Hammack, 62 Va. 42, 173 S.E. 535 (0934).
ri 2 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 37 Pac. (2d) 170 (1934).
5,5 137 Ore. 230, 2 Pac. (zd) i8.
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also held that it is immaterial from whom the consideration em-
anates in order to constitute the occupant a passenger and not a
guest.5" Conferring a benefit upon the host is sufficient to elimi-
nate the occupant from the operation of the Guest Act."
Where the riding in the host's car is to result in some mu-
tual benefit to the occupant and host, the occupant is not a guest
within the Act.58 See the recent case of Hallgreen v. Wilson
(decided March, 1935), 18 Ohio Abs. 652, in which a servant
contemplating transportation to her home as part of her com-
pensation was held not a guest on the doctrine of mutual benefit.
This situation of mutual benefit often arises in cases where a
salesman of an auto dealer invites a prospective purchaser for
a demonstration ride and an accident occurs. See a leading case,
Bookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co., 215 Iowa 8, 244
N.W. 721 (1933). The court said at page 723, "A prospective
buyer of an automobile . . . is not riding therein as a matter
of hospitality-as a mere gratuity-but is rendering value re-
ceived for his transporation."59 The same rule applies when a
5 McGuire v. Armstrong, 268 Mich. 152, 255 N.W. 745 (1934); see
Blanchette v. Sargent, 173 Ati. 383 (N.H., 1934.) where a motorist promised
to pick the paintiff up in his auto, his son promising to "fix it up" with the
motorist. "It is immaterial whether the compensation is direct or indirect."
Haney v. Takikura (Note 54.
5 Moreasv. Ferry, 135 Calif. App. 202, 26 Pac. (2d) 886 (1933).
" "The legislature, when it used the word 'guest' did not intend to
include persons who are being transported for the mutual benefit of both the
passenger and the operator . . . of the car." Kruey v. Smith, io8 Conn. 628,
144- Ad. 304 (1929).
In the following cases occupants of cars have been held not to be guests:
A farm employee driven to work by his employer. Russell v. Parlee, 115 Conn.
687, 163 Ad. 404 (1932).
A servant driven by his employer to buy shoes for use in his employ-
ment, Knuston v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 251 N.W. 147 (1933).
One gratuitously helping to deliver goods. Jackson v. Queen, 257
Mass. 515, 154 N.E. 78 (1926).
Skilled driver accompanying novice for benefit of novice. Semons v.
Toune, 285 Mass. 96, 18o N.E. 605 (934).
One cranking a car for his host. Hunter v. Baldwin, 268 Mich. io6,
755 N.W. 431 (1934).
51 In Olefsky v. Ludwig, 272 N.Y.S. 158, 242 App. Div. 637 (I934),
the court held that as a matter of law the plaintiff's contribution to expenses
such as gasoline, oil and garage charges do not constitute "payment for trans-
portation" within the Connecticut Guest Act.
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plaintiff is a prospective purchaser of real estate riding in the
vendor's car for purposes of inspecting the property."0 Master-
servant relationships where tangible benefits accrue to the driver
from the transportation such as saving the driver's time or fa-
cilitating his work are not within the Guest Act."' The courts,
keeping in mind the purpose of the Act, are prone to find some
consideration if at all possible where the facts warrant, in order
that the case may not come within the Guest Act.
In conclusion it may be said that the Guest Acts have un-
doubtedly accomplished their aim, namely, to relieve insurance
companies of court actions in which guest and driver collude to
mulct the insurance company. While the common law of some
states is identical to that which the guest statutes have codified,
it is expected, nevertheless, that within a few years practically
every state will enact this type of legislation.
°Sullivav. Richardson, xg Cal. App. 367, 6 Pac. (2) 567 (I93i).
6 Knuston v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 251 N.W. 147 (1933).
